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GETTING RIGHT WITH "THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE"
R. Kent Newmyer*
In delivering the Inaugural John Marshall lecture last year, Courtesy
Professor G. Edward White used Oliver Wendell Holmes's speech of the
on John Marshall to understand Holmes.' I would like to use o as P.
Holmes's remarks on Marshall to understand Marshall, at least Woodlock.
as the starting point for our effort to
"get right" with him. If we can under-
stand Marshall and his legal world
rightly, perhaps we can appreciate our
own more fully. So with your kind
indulgence, let me travel back a cen-
tury to Holmes's speech (briefly) and
then back two centuries to Marshall
and his world.
The Single Representative Figure
of American Law
Holmes was Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in 1901 when he delivered his com-
ments celebrating the centennial of
Marshall's assumption of duties as chief
justice in 1801. For openers, Holmes
said what everyone expected him to
say-and what dozens of praiseful law-
yers and judges across the country
were saying in 1901: "If American law were to be represented by John
a single figure, skeptic and worshiper alike would agree without Marshall
dispute that the figure could be one alone, and that one, John Litho-
Marshall."2  gph,
After that deferential bow, Holmes invited his audience to William
ponder a paradox-the kind Holmes himself loved, as some- Henry
Brown.
The author is Professor of Law and History at the University of Connecticut
School of Law. This article is the text from which Professor Newmyer presented the James
D. St. Clair Court Public Education Project's Second Annual John Marshall Lecture on
February 1, 2002, at the J. Joseph Moakley Courthouse in Boston. It is drawn from
Professor Newmyer's recently published biography, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the
Supreme Court.
1. G. Edward White, Looking at Holmes Looking at Marshall, 7 MASs. LEGAL HISTORY 63
(2001).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
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thing to activate the mind. "If I were to think of John Marshall
simply by numbers and measure in the abstract," he said, "I
might hesitate in my superlatives."3 And hesitate he then did.
Rather than depicting Marshall as a Promethean figure who
defied history to shape history, Holmes instead observed that he
"represented a great ganglion in the nerves of society."' Or, in a
similar vein, that Marshall was "a strategic point in the campaign
of history, and part of his greatness consists in his being there."5
To drive the point home, he then declared irreverently that
"after Hamilton and the Constitution itself," Marshall had not
much to offer beyond "a strong intellect, a good style, personal
ascendancy in his court, courage, justice and convictions of his
party."' No small matters these, we might observe, but in Holmes's
assessment, not the stuff of true greatness.
There is a distinct taste of sour grapes in Holmes's
back-handed compliments. Professor White attributed this fact
to Holmes's frustration at being merely the chief judge of a state
court, a position not calculated to display his true genius.' In
addition to being vainly ambitious, however, Holmes was a deep
student of American legal history. He was also a keen observer
of lawyers, judges, and indeed, of humanity in general. His
irreverent assessment of Marshall is worth attending to. First,
Holmes supplied some much needed critical perspective on
Marshall, who in 1901, was being wrested from his own age to
adorn the American nation state. "It is [cautioned Holmes] idle
to take a man apart from the circumstances which, in fact, were
his." Holmes also broached the issue of Marshall's originality:
what, if anything, it means in terms of constitutional law and
whether it was a necessary attribute of Marshall's greatness.
In all of his remarks, Holmes looked to Marshall's own age,
insisting that historical context is the essence of biography. What
we are left to ponder is what was it about Marshall's age that
invited so much greatness? On a related note, how did Marshall's
unique qualities of mind and heart mesh with history to shape
his age and ours?
Here in a nutshell is the basic question facing all biographers:
how much do the times make the man (or woman) and how
much does the man (or woman) make the times. With this
question in mind, then, let's look at Marshall's rendezvous with
history. How did he shape American constitutional law and
3. Id. at 267.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 269.
7. White, supra note 1, at 70-71.
8. HoLMEs, supra note 2, at 267.
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make the Supreme Court a major player in American govern-
ment?
Marshall's Times
First the times. The years between Marshall's birth in 1755
and his death in 1835 were uniquely formative. During no other
period in American history was there so much to be accom-
plished, so much incentive to direct the course of events. Several
factors account for the creative potential of these years, but the
American Revolution was the heart of the matter. By the "Revo-
lution" I mean not only the war itself, but also the debate that
preceded the fighting and the period between the end of the war
in 1783 and the ratification of the Constitution in 1788. No other
event in our history educated those it touched more profoundly-
if by education we mean the manner in which a culture conveys
and transforms itself from one age to the next. No other genera-
tion of Americans witnessed the birth of the nation. Never before
or since would the reasons for war or the possibilities of peace be
so thoroughly and brilliantly discussed by so many. Finally,
never would the principles of government settled on be so
deeply rooted in the simultaneous acts of thinking and fighting
and lawmaking. Never would principles of government and law
be so thoroughly tested in the laboratory of real politics as during
this prolonged period of constitution-making.
For twenty of his first thirty-two years, as a young man
growing up on the northwest frontier of Virginia, Marshall was
bombarded with the republican lessons of the Revolution. Un-
der his father's tutelage, from 1765 to 1775, he followed the
transforming debate in Virginia over liberty, power, and empire.
For six years, first as an officer in the Culpeper militia and then
in Washington's Continental Army, he fought to protect the
principles of liberty agreed upon in the preceding debate. For
another six years, as a novice lawyer and member of the Virginia
legislature, he labored to implement those principles in the
context of state politics shaped by the Articles of Confederation.
During the debate over ratification of the new Constitution in
Virginia in 1788, the thirty-three year-old lawyer stepped forth
on the national stage as a forceful champion of the new nation
and the new Constitution.
Put yourself in Marshall's boots. He was born a citizen of the
glorious British Empire and with every prospect of becoming,
like his father, a respectable member of the Anglo-Virginia
gentry. The Revolution changed all that. Fighting made him a
traitor. Winning made him a patriot citizen of the new republic
and a life-long champion of the national union. And, signifi-
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cantly for Marshall's education, the American Revolution was a
constitutional war-one replete with fundamental lessons about
government, about leadership (Washington was Marshall's
model statesman), about public service, and most importantly
for Marshall, about the danger of states' rights which hampered
the war effort. Marshall's constitutional nationalism was born at
Valley Forge.
Being there at the creation encouraged Marshall and his
contemporaries to think and act boldly in the job of nation-
building. The public arena was small, the whole country in 1790
had half as many people as New York City today. The number
of aspiring statesmen was small, especially in Virginia where it
was assumed that only the elite were qualified to govern. Insti-
tutions were fluid and malleable. Young and ambitious men and
women who venture inside the Beltway today are apt to be
suffocated by entrenched institutions and attitudes. In Marshall's
age every act was a precedent.
Abigail Adams, wife of the president who put Marshall on
the Court, captured the potential of the age elegantly in a letter
to her young son John Quincy Adams in 1779:
These are times in which a genius would wish to
live .... Great necessities call out great virtues.
When a mind is raised, and animated by scenes
that engage the heart, then those qualities which
would otherwise lay dormant, wake into life and
form the character of the hero and the states-
man.9
His "Great Necessities"
And what were those "great necessities" that called forth
greatness? For Marshall the issue that engaged his heart and
mind was nation-building. As his famous biographer, Albert
Beveridge, put it: "American nationalism was Marshall's one
and only great conception, and the fostering of it the purpose of
his life."' 0 On this general goal, Marshall did not differ from other
statesmen of the founding generation. The problem was the
"founding brothers" could not agree on what the new nation
should look like: whether it should be agrarian or commercial
and manufacturing; slave or free; democratic and egalitarian or
republican and aristocratic. In time, these cultural differences of
opinion translated into a struggle between nationalists in the
North and states' rightists in the South. The political differences
9. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 226 (2001).
10. 4 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 1 (1916-1919).
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between the sections, moreover-as Alexis de Tocqueville fa-
mously observed-were bound to appear before the Supreme
Court as constitutional questions."
In our age, the dominant theme of constitutional law is civil
rights. In Marshall's age, the great issue was the nature of the
federal union under the Constitution and finally, as Marshall
saw it, whether there would be a Union at all or a mere collection
of sovereign states. If Marshall infused his jurisprudence with
the"passion of his own intense convictions," as Benjamin Cardozo
claimed, 2 it was because there was so much at stake. If he
worked tirelessly to consolidate the interpretive authority of the
Court, it was because he wanted to enlist the Court in this great
struggle.
It was a contest, I might add, that pitted Marshall against the
dominant states' rights theorists of his own state: Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court
of Appeals, John Taylor of Caroline County (who wrote three
books in three years to refute Marshall's jurisprudence) to men-
tion only some. In fact, the constitutional history of the early
republic at times seems like a domestic quarrel among the
statesmen of the Old Dominion. In this constitutional shoot-out,
the chief protagonists were Chief Justice Marshall and his second
cousin, President Thomas Jefferson. It was surely one of the most
creative mutual hatreds in American history.
Where He Stood
And where did Marshall stand in this battle over constitu-
tional union? Ironically it was his opponents-Jefferson, Roane
and company-who first asked and answered that question.
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland13-upholding the
constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States by way
of implied powers-called them to the barricades. Marshall, they
claimed, had bamboozled his fellow justices and turned the
Court into his own instrument for destroying the states and
consolidating power in the national government.
Many historians resist the notion that Marshall single-
handedly rewrote the Constitution. But many, including Albert
Beveridge, whose great biography won the Pulitzer Prize in
1920, depict the chief justice as an uncompromising nationalist
who molded the Constitution to his own liking. In this scenario,
the Marshall Court was on the cutting edge of American history
as it moved in a straight line toward the post-New Deal nation
11. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357-58 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Francis Bowen ed., Cambridge: Sever and Francis 1862) (1835).
12. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 170 (1921).
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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state. In the process, the mythical Marshall came to symbolize
and legitimize the so-called "living constitution," wherein the
justices freely amend the document to meet the changing needs
of the American people.
The truth is much less dramatic and much more complicated.
Without a doubt Marshall put the Constitution on a sound
nationalist footing. But he was not a consolidating nationalist who
aimed to destroy the states. Nor did he play free and easy with
the Framer's Constitution or run roughshod over his colleagues
on the Court to do so. As Marshall saw it-read his despairing
letters to his friend and colleague Joseph Story-he was not
creating a new constitution. Instead, he was fighting to preserve
the one that his states' rights enemies wanted to replace with the
old Articles of Confederation. He sincerely believed that he was
on the losing side of antebellum history. And he had a point-
witness the all-out attack on the Court in the 1820s, culminating
in the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. President Jackson
opposed nullification and threatened to hang the nullifiers, to be
sure. But he also refused to enforce the Marshall Court's deci-
sions in the Cherokee Indian cases, and in general, went along
with the movement to curb the Court which had been underway
across the nation since the 1820s. Most threateningly, he ap-
pointed new justices to the Supreme Court who agreed with his
small government, states' rights philosophy. Two years after
Marshall's death in 1835, seven of the nine justices were
Jacksonians, including the new Chief Justice, Roger Taney.
As a young man of the Revolution, Marshall had been on the
cutting edge of history; increasingly he was on the margin.
During the last years of his life, he saw himself as a Burkean
conservative dedicated to preserving the Constitution and the
republic from the ideological demagoguery of democratic poli-
ticians. He may have been a "ganglion of nerves" designed to
register the feelings of the times, as Holmes said, but he was also
fundamentally at odds with two of the dominant historical
developments of his own age-states' rights and political de-
mocracy-both of which he traced to Jefferson. Recognizing this
fact throws a new light on his jurisprudence and on his effort to
strengthen the Court as an institution.
So how does this view of antebellum history revise our
understanding of Marshall's jurisprudence? His place in Ameri-
can history? The tendency has been to assess his legacy in terms
of legal doctrine as set forth in his great opinions: implied powers
in McCulloch v. Maryland; national authority over interstate
commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden;14 and so on. Definitive great cases
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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make for compelling drama, which historians and biographers
love-and lawyers, too, since they need clear and definitive
precedents to bolster their arguments. Both historians and law-
yers, then, are tempted to see Marshall's opinions as perfect
constitutional truth issuing from the brow of Jove.
His famous nationalist opinions look differently, however,
when we view them not as efforts to rewrite the Constitution but
to preserve it. They appear in a different light when we consider-
as Marshall himself assuredly did-that doctrinal compromise
was often necessary on a divided Court, and that it was essential
to survival in a hostile political world, where the Court's enemies
had the upper hand.
Take Marbury v. Madison'5 as a case in point. Lawyers and
historians alike have seen that opinion as having settled judicial
review in one glorious moment and for all time. Over the years,
the Supreme Court itself has cited the case literally thousands of
times-whenever they needed to bolster their interpretive au-
thority. A careful reading of the opinion, however, shows that
Marshall did not claim that the Court's interpretation was final,
or that it was binding on congress. Indeed, as a precedent, the
opinion technically applied only to congressional acts dealing
with judicial power. In short, Marshall did not say more than the
traffic would bear, which may explain why there was almost no
opposition to the judicial review portion of the opinion in 1803-
even from the Jeffersonians.
Or take Gibbons v. Ogden-also cited thousands of times as if
it settled the matter of federal commerce power once and for all.
A careful reading, however, reveals a delicate and nuanced
treatment of the matter. In laying out the sweeping definition of
federal commerce power in that case, for example, Marshall
refused to hold that congressional authority automatically ex-
cluded the states (a point urged on him at the bar by Daniel
Webster and by his colleague Justice Story). Instead, he held that,
short of a direct conflict between state and federal statutes, states
had concurrent power over interstate commerce. His opinion
also adumbrated the idea of state police power which in certain
circumstances might trump even federal commerce power. Even
the states' rightists found little to complain about. The nuances
in Marshall's opinion, moreover, gave subsequent courts room
to maneuver. Perhaps we should not be surprised that Justice
Clarence Thomas and Justice Stephen G. Breyer should both cite
Gibbons in the same case'6 to prove opposite points.
15. 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; 584, 593-96 (Thomas, J., concurring); 615
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (1995).
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Consider McCulloch, the most hotly contested of Marshall's
Coute nationalist opinions. That opinion seems far less radical-as
Social Law Marshall himself insisted-when it is recalled that the constitu-
Library, tionality of the national bank via implied powers had been
Boston. recognized for thirty years by congress and by presidents from
both parties. Marshall's powerful exposi-
tion of constitutional nationalism in that
opinion, moreover, was not gratuitous
aggression as Roane and Jefferson
charged, but was a response to the dema-
gogic, union-busting states rights' argu-
ments of counsel for Maryland.
What I'm suggesting here is that
Marshall, far from being blindly
consolidationist, tried to balance national
and state authority (which is precisely the
point argued brilliantly by James Madi-
son in The Federalist No. 39). Among the
powers Marshall conceded to the states
was control over the institution of sla-
very. Marshall himself was a slave holder
and a Southerner to boot. But, here as
elsewhere, Marshall followed the intent
of the Framers (who in marking the line
between state and federal authority were
John behaving like the practical-minded political realists they were).
Marshall Like the Framers, Marshall understood the preeminence of state
From a and local government in the lives of the American people at that
crayon by
Saint- time-and obversely, the fragility and experimental nature of
Memin, the new Constitution. As Princeton historian John Murrin has
1808 noted, the Constitution was "a roof without walls"-for many
From John decades "a substitute for any deeper national identity."17 If the
Marshal:
The Framers had attempted to destroy the states, their Constitution
Tribute of could not have been ratified bythe states. If Marshall would have
Massachu- attempted to do so, he would have doomed both the Court and
setts, the Constitution.
Boston, In other words, Marshall was not making constitutional law1901. wholesale, but rather was following the "intent of the Framers."
"Original intent" is a problematic and hotly-debated concept at
present. Not so in Marshall's age. The simple reason is that the
Marshall Court was attempting to answer the same questions
that the Framers of the Constitution addressed: interstate com-
17. John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,
in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
346 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
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merce, state-issued paper money and national currency, to
mention only the most obvious. In answering these questions
the conservative, property-minded Framers turned into real
radicals. They created a nation where there was none. If Marshall
appeared to be an extreme nationalist, it was because he struggled
to maintain the nationalism of 1787 when the.tide of history was
running against it.
This was the "campaign of history" to which Holmes re-
ferred. Like Washington, his patron and model statesman, the
chief justice was a commander in the field, constantly assessing
the lay of the land, the strength of the Court's enemies, and
playing to their weaknesses and his strengths. In this setting,
judicial strategy was a major component of his greatness-and
his originality. He had enough sense not to theorize or philoso-
phize when to have done so would have invited counterattack.
In his great opinions he knew when to hold and when to fold.
Whichever position he chose, he defended with impeccable
logic embossed with some of the most quotable rhetoric in the
Court's long history.
His Design
I've been arguing that Marshall's great opinions need to be
read for the nuances and shades of meaning. Now I would like
to suggest that we should look beyond the separate opinions
entirely and search for the design in the tapestry of his jurispru-
dence. Doing so reveals a remarkable pattern-one in which
McCulloch, Gibbons and his Contract Clause opinions were inter-
connected and mutually supportive. The common policy de-
nominator of these opinions was national market. By striking
down state laws interfering with contracts; by preventing states
from interfering with interstate commerce; by giving congress
authority to create a uniform national currency and a national
transportation system, Marshall hoped to encourage the growth
of an "economic e pluribus unum," as he called it in Gibbons (a
phrase he borrowed from Webster's argument). 8
To state the point somewhat differently: Marshall realized
that judicial pronouncements, however eloquent, could not
themselves preserve the Federal Union. The American people,
as he was fond of saying, had created the Union, and only they
could preserve it. And being ordinary mortals (and not political
saints), they needed a self-interested reason for doing so. Na-
tional economic prosperity based on cooperation among all the
sections was the reason. Americans fought together during the
Revolution to create the nation, now with the Court's help they
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 14.
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could work together to preserve and strengthen the nation they
created.
To forge national identity around economic self-interest
would take time, however, and time was running out. The last
ten years of Marshall's tenure was dedicated to conserving the
beachhead he won during the first twenty. With the Court's
external enemies in power, with new states' rights justices
nipping at his heals, it was a true test of leadership. And it is to
Marshall's leadership of the Court-and his transformation of
the Court as an institution-on which I would now like to focus.
His Institution
To appreciate the significance of his accomplishment, we
need to retrace our steps and glance briefly at the Court as it stood
in March, 1801, when he took charge. It was not an inspiring
sight. Indeed, everything pointed to the Court's permanent
status as the "least dangerous branch," as Hamilton called it in
The Federalist No. 78. This is not to gainsay the progress made
during the 1790s. The Court was an ongoing concern, and its
place in the overall structure of the federal judicial system had
been settled by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Rules of the Court had
been agreed upon by the justices. Circuit riding was imple-
mented (to the dismay of all). The justices had issued a handful
of important constitutional decisions-enough to suggest the
Court's yet unrealized powers of judicial review.
The Court's disabilities, on the other hand, were immense.
Important decisions there had been, yes, but only about one a
year (hardly enough to keep six ambitious justices engaged). Not
surprisingly, there was a rapid turnover during the first decade.
Chief Justice Jay even resigned to become governor of New York!
Presidents Washington and Adams also had trouble filling va-
cancies (Marshall himself being one of those who turned down
an associate justiceship). In truth, Congress, not the Court, was
the center of constitutional action in the 1790s. More ominously
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-drafted secretly
by Madison and Jefferson-argued that the states, not the Su-
preme Court, should settle disputed constitutional issues. An
argument Marshall answered in Marbury v. Madison, by the way.
Finally, because all the justices were Federalists and because
the Court's decisions followed Federalist priorities, the Court got
caught up in the violent party battles of the 1790s-unfortu-
nately on the losing side. The disputed election of 1800, wherein
the Jeffersonians took political control of the federal govern-
ment, set the stage. President Adams made Marshall chief justice
with the rather desperate hope that the Court, under his leader-
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ship, could contain the states' rights radicalism of the new
president and his party. For his part, President Jefferson set out
to humble the Court and eradicate "the spirit of Marshallism," as
he put it to James Monroe in April, 1800.'1 The gauntlet was
down.
So, given the Court's vulnerabilities to the political branches
and growing force of states rights, how did the new chief justice
manage to elevate the Court as an institution? The Court's
forceful assertion of its rightful jurisdiction, of course, comes to
mind, not just in Marbury, but also in Martin v. Hunter's LesseeA
and Cohens v. Virginia21 -the latter being Marshall's most elo-
quent statement on national union and the Court's appellate
authority.
What might be overlooked by focusing on these famous
decisions, however, is the silent institutional revolution insti-
tuted by Marshall, which gave these decisions meaning and,
indeed, which gave meaning and clout to all the decisions of the
Marshall Court (and every Court thereafter). I'm referring to a
major shift in the Court's working procedures: the shift from the
practice where each justice wrote a separate opinion to a single
majority opinion written by one justice. Seriatim opinions was
the practice in England, in colonial America, in state courts, and
in the Supreme Court in the 1790s.
Marshall changed this tradition. Not only did he persuade
his colleagues to submerge their own opinions into a majority
opinion, but in nearly all the great constitutional cases he spoke
for the majority. This new mode of proceeding proved to be
permanent, despite the efforts of Justice William Johnson, at the
insistence of Jefferson, to reinstate seriatim opinions. A revolu-
tionary change had taken place, one which transformed the
Court. For until the justices spoke in one voice, as an institution,
the Court could not claim to be the authoritative interpreter of
the Constitution, which is the real meaning of judicial review.
How did Marshall pull off this stunning victory against such
odds? One factor, as Justice William Johnson explained to Jefferson
in 1822-in a brutally frank, overstated, but partly true letter-
was the weakness and laziness of Marshall's colleagues during
the first years of his tenure.? Even more important in explaining
the Court's new unity was the unyielding hostility of the
Jeffersonians to the Court which Marshall used to unite his
19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Apr. 12, 1800), in 19 Woms or
THOMAs JEFFERSON 120 (Andrew A. Lipscombe & Albert Bergh eds., 1903).
20. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
21. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
22. Letter from William Johnson to ThomasJefferson (Dec.10, 1822),Jefferson Papers
(MSS Library of Congress), quoted in DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE
FIRST DIssENrER 181-82 (1954).
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Courtesy colleagues. Most important of all in this process of institutional
of the unification was the chief justice himself: the way his legal genius,
Hon. his character, and his personality fit the unique institutional
Douglas P. circumstances of the early Court. "Being there" was important as
Woodlock. Holmes suggested. No less important was the fact that it was John
Marshall who was there. Consider, for
starters, the way his legal and intellec-
tual strengths suited the daily work-
ing procedures of the Court. In an age
when well over ninety percent of the
Court's business had to do with the
common law, it helped that Marshall
was a superb common law lawyer with
twenty years of experience in the state
and federal courts of Virginia. In the
period before printed briefs, when the
lag-time between oral argument and
decision was a matter of weeks if not
days, it helped that Marshall was a
quick learner with a quick pen. A look
at the nine brilliant newspaper essays
he wrote in defense of McCulloch in the
course of thirteen weeks tells us just
how quick he was and how persua-
sive. In an age when justices had no
help from clerks, they rose or fell on
Joseph the basis of demonstrated ability, and in the intimate setting of
Story the Court back then there was literally no place to hide. In the
Litho- give-and-take of judicial conference, ability counted and here
graph, Marshall had a leg up; with ability came authority.
1844 But authority, if that is the right word, was administered
William
Henry with gentleness, restraint, modesty and humor, and therein lies
Brown. the key to Marshall's success in unifying the Court. Unfortu-
nately for historians, it is hardlo catch the chief justice in the act
of leading. There are few telltale Court papers from this early
period, no internal memos, no judicial memoirs, and no law
clerks to tell all. Marshall's own papers contain only a few
tantalizing tidbits and no smoking guns.
Occasionally, however, the veil of secrecy parts-for ex-
ample when Marshall's future colleague Joseph Story caught a
glimpse of the chief in action when he visited the Court in 1808.
Story was struck by the quality of Marshall's legal mind, how he
"unravels the mysteries with irresistible acuteness" and "subtle
logic." But what impressed Story most of all was Marshall's
personality and his style of leadership. His manners wrote Story,
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were "plain, yet dignified" and he had "an unaffected modesty
that diffused itself through all his actions." Story loved his laugh,
too, which was "too hearty for an intriguer." And "his good
temper and unwearied patience are equally agreeable on the
bench and in the study."2
Those who knew Marshall agreed with Story's assessment-
except for Jefferson and Spencer Roane. Even his ideological
opponents, Patrick Henry and John Randolph of Roanoke,
loved him for his decency and patriotism. Perhaps no one
summed up Marshall's character so well as Jared Sparks, the
biographer of Washington (as was Marshall) and the future
president of Harvard. In 1826, Sparks went to Richmond to pay
his respects to the aging chief, and came away in awe of Marshall's
republican character. The blending into a consistent whole, as he
put it, of "all things about him-his house, grounds, office,
himself," and how they all "bear marks of a primitive simplicity
and plainness rarely to be seen combined."M
For contemporaries on and off the Court, Marshall symbol-
ized the republican legacy of the Revolution. Now observe how
perfectly Marshall's republican personality fit the unique living
and working arrangements of the Court. In Marshall's time, the
justices spent only a couple of months a year in Washington, the
rest of their time was spent riding the circuit as trial judges.
Because the new capital was such a miserable place to live, they
(like members of the political branches) left their families at home
and took up quarters in one of the city's numerous boarding
houses. The boarding house, of necessity, was easily converted
into an informal conference room where arguments and debates
of the day continued over dinner and wine.
Marshall took care of these living arrangements himself and
probably chose the wine as well. (He ordered wine for his
Richmond cellar by the pipe-which is 126 gallons!) He was also
the chief beneficiary of them, because the intimate setting was a
perfect venue for his egalitarian, democratic, modest style of
leadership. His signal accomplishment-even while he directed
traffic and performed the lion's share of opinion writing-was to
see to it that his colleagues shared in the collective deliberations
of the Court, even if they disagreed with the majority opinion as
they increasingly did. As Marshall explained in his public debate
with Roane in 1819:
23. Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 25, 1808), in 1 THE LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 166-67 (William Wetmore Story ed., Boston, C.C. Little and J.
Brown 1851).
24. Interview with Jared Sparks in Richmond, Va. (Apr. 1, 1826), in 10 PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 283-84 (Charles Hobson ed., 2000).
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The opinion . .. delivered as the opinion of the
court, is previously submitted to the consider-
ation of all the judges; and if any part of the rea-
soning be disapproved, it must be so modified
as to receive the approbation of all, before it can
be delivered as the opinion of all?5
By facilitating a collective deliberative process among his
colleagues, Marshall invited them to think of themselves not as
six isolated justices-which they had been-but as a single
entity, a branch of government on a par with congress and the
executive no less.
Looking at the way Marshall infused the Court with his own
personality during its most formative period, one is inclined to
think Emerson got it right when he said, "An institution is the
lengthened shadow of one man."' No other figure in American
history, I would venture to say, has done so much to give
permanent shape to an institution of government.
Losing the Final Word
And so you might well ask: why did Marshall's despondent
letters to his friend Story in the 1830s bemoan the demise of the
Court and the Constitution? Why did he die thinking he had
failed-when he is now celebrated as the representative figure of
American law? Although complicated, the answer is that ante-
bellum history-his states' rights opponents to be specific-
taught him that the Supreme Court (despite its miraculous
advancement) did not have the final word on the Constitution.
Several simultaneous developments drove home that bitter
lesson. One such was the long tradition of successful state
resistance to the Court's decisions: nullification in South Caro-
lina and Georgia's resistance to the Cherokee Indian decisions
being only the last of a long line. As a member of the Virginia
Constitutional Convention of 1829-30, he heard the unhinging
rhetoric of tidewater slave holders who threatened to fight
anyone who challenged their power and the institution of
slavery-whether it be the abolitionists of the North or the
democratic farmers of western Virginia who were trying to gain
fair representation in the Virginia legislature. Marshall hoped
that the Supreme Court could check the tyranny of the demo-
cratic majority as it sailed toward the shoals of disunion and civil
25. John Marshall, Friend to the Union, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 78, 81 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
26. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance in EMERSON: ESSAYS AND LECTURES 267 (Library
of America ed. 1983) (ESSAYS FIRST SERIES 1841).
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war. Instead of saving
the old republic from




ized" from the inside by
new Jacksonian ap-
pointees. Marshall
didn't live to see the
states' rights nature of
the new Democratic
majority on the Taney
Court, but he saw the
writing on the wall. And





and at unimaginable costs to both sides. For someone trying to Stereo-
assess Marshall's career, and particularly his struggle with graph
Jefferson, it is hard not to read antebellum history backwards view
"A Lone
with the war in mind. The war was a crushing blow to Marshall's Grave on
dream of a law-abiding, Court-obeying republic. Perhaps there the
is no sadder or more telling symbol of that failure than one of Battlefield
Alexander Gardner's Civil War photographs: the shallow grave of
of a soldier at the foot of a battle-scared tree, the tree silhouetted Antietam."Alexander
against the sky. Beneath the tree's fractured branches stand Gardner
several soldiers, leaning battle-weary on their rifles or standing (1821-
strangely at attention. The photograph was taken after Antietam's 1882)
bloody work was done. The dead soldier, from the Twenty-eighth Series:
Brady'sPennsylvania Volunteers, was Private John Marshall. The unfor- Album
tunate soldier was not a namesake, but in an age famous for Gallery,
remembering famous men, he easily could have been. In any 570
case, the image conveys a tragic truth: What Marshall had feared, Stereo-
what he had worked to avoid, had come to pass. The rule of law graph PR-P 065-788-
as a rational way of settling disputes had given way, first to 02.
political demagoguery and ideological extremism in the North
and South, then to the lord of battles. The Union he hoped to Courtesy
preserve by adhering to the Constitution had gone to war over of the
New-Yorkits meaning. His own state, his own grandchildren, fought Historical
against the nation he had fought to create. Indeed, when Robert Society.
E. Lee surrendered to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court
House, the young officer by his side was Marshall's grandson,
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Col. Charles Marshall. Out of the bloody conflict would come a
new birth of freedom, to be sure, and the Union endured,
stronger for having withstood the stress of war. So, of course, did
the Supreme Court. But the new era was light-years removed
from Marshall's world and hostile to much that was dear to him.
Ironically, it was this pulsating, chaotic age that bestowed on him
its highest honors and fame that he doubted would ever be his.
4"..
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